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Emerging Adulthood Transitions in Japan: The Role of Marriage 
and Housing Careers  
 
Abstract  
Postwar Japanese adulthood derived from a hegemonic framework in which young people 
formed home-owning family households featuring ‘salary-men’ and female-homemakers. 
Since the 1980s, however, along with prolonged economic downturn, Japanese adult transitions 
have become increasingly fragmented and non-linear. A growing concern has been the social, 
economic and ontological individualization of younger adults, resulting in a phenomenal 
decline in partnering and marriage, on the one hand, and sharp increases in young people either 
staying on in the natal home or living alone. Dominant understandings of contemporary 
transitions into adulthood have focused on focus on ‘delay’, especially in terms of the labour 
market, in context of socioeconomic decline since the bursting of the economic bubble in the 
1990s. This paper, however, focuses on the interaction of marriage and housing careers which 
play particularly important roles. Our analysis thereby contributes to both understanding of 
social contingencies that shape adult transitions, especially in industrialized East Asian 
societies, and also the role of housing and marriage markets together in mediating the 






Significant changes in life-course transitions among younger adults have become evident 
across industrialised nations in recent decades. In many cases, realignment has presented itself 
as a delay, with new cohorts of young people moving more slowly through standardised 
conduits toward adulthood: school leaving, labour market entry, marriage and family formation 
(see Arnett, 2000; Buchmann and Kriesi, 2011; Biggart et al., 2001; Frustenberg, 2013). For 
those entering adulthood in Japan’s post-bubble economy, the fading of corporate welfare and 
income security has had a particular impact on the formation of couples and rates of marriage. 
As family formation declined, so to have conventional transitions into independent living and 
through housing careers to eventual home ownership. Indeed, the Japanese case does not 
simply parallel shifts in transition patterns observed in western-based studies (Sato et al., 2010), 
with delays in each aspect of transition appearing more intertwined and enduring.  
Within Japan, declining movement through formal employment and marriage has been 
perceived as a social threat and a driver of low-fertility underlying current processes of social 
ageing and population decline (Shirahase, 2007). Indeed, recent research has illustrated that 
even sexual activity is diminishing among Japan’s younger cohorts (e.g. Matsuura, 2005). 
Meanwhile, the ratio of people still unmarried at 50 has almost doubled for women and more 
than tripled for men between 1990 and 2010 (IPSSR, 2013). These remarkable shifts have been 
associated with a growing reluctance among younger people to adopt adult roles (Yamada, 
1999) although many researchers have also argued that structural factors have posed particular 
transitional challenges to younger generations, especially those into work (see Genda, 2002; 
Brinton, 2010).  
Rather than simple delay or diversification in adult transitions, Japan presents a specific 
disalignment between routes into, and the full achievement of adult life-courses. The analytical 
lenses of this paper are housing and marriage processes, which, we argue, have interacted to 
influence this transformation. Drawing on diverse data sources, we analyse how changes in 
marriage and partnering have undermined family household formation, which has, in turn, been 
enhanced by the structure of the housing system. This focus on marriage and housing in Japan 
aims to advance understanding of life-course processes in a number of respects. First, studies 
of adult transitions in Japan have largely dwelt on the effects of labour market restructuring 
(see Brinton, 2010; Inui, 2009; Toivonen, 2013), on the one hand, and changing courtship 
among younger people (see Ishida, 2013; Raymo and Iwasawa, 2005; Yoshida, 2011), on the 
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other. Thus, while shifting adult transitions have been an increasing concern (Miyamato, 2004), 
the focus has been restrictive. In particular we consider the importance of the ‘home’ and 
‘housing ladders’, as intersections of social and personal domains, in progression into full adult 
roles. Second, the Japanese case provides a contrast to western contexts, with ‘emerging 
adulthood’ – as Arnett (2000) describes the growing period of instability before the full 
achievement of adult status and identity – reflecting a different type of advanced modernity 
(Beck and Grande, 2010). In the Japanese context, the diminishing appearance of 
‘economically independent and reproductive adult households’ has been especially disruptive 
at a number of levels. Individually, marriage and owner-occupation are closely bound together 
and are critical to achieving welfare security in later life. Socially, the impact has been a rapid 
rise in unmarried people, an explosion in one-person households and falling fertility. 
Individualization has been intensive in this context (Suzuki et al., 2010), but characteristically 
isolating and inhibitive rather than liberational.   
This paper unfolds in four further sections. The first establishes how transitions into adulthood 
have been understood by sociologists and demographers, as well as why these positions need 
to be problematized and empirically examined in the case of Japan. The second section 
considers the outcomes in terms of declining marriage and growing concerns with ‘marriage 
hunting’. The third section analyses the role of the housing system and in particular the impact 
of housing market structures in reinforcing contemporary household patterns, and in stifling 
progress for non-family households. Attention finally turns to the broader and longer-term 
implications of diversified or dis-aligning adult transitions for welfare relations and social 
values, as well as the recent boom in shared rental housing, which represents a potential 
alternative to established notions of mature adulthood.   
 
Transitions to Adulthood 
While the process of becoming a full adult member of society is mediated differently in each 
culture, in industrialised societies, transitions from youth to adulthood have historically 
appeared to follow a common and ‘demographically dense’ sequence (Kohli, 2007). In recent 
years, life-course transitions have been increasingly disrupted in many ways. Socioeconomic 
restructuring is argued to have extended and diversified education and employment transitions 
promoting a new life-course phase in-between youth and adulthood featuring movement back 
and forth between dependent and independent status (Furlong and Cartmel, 2007). Arnett 
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(2000, 2006), views this period of emerging adulthood as being highly unsettled with 
importance placed on identity and individual conceptions of autonomy rather than traditional 
markers of maturity. It manifests itself as leisurely and lengthy explorations of identity, lifestyle 
and career possibilities, and features neither a sense of adolescence nor full adulthood. Another 
characteristic is the diminishing salience of existing conduits of adult identities – with some 
increasingly omitted, such as marriage – and linear progression becoming less characteristic, 
with movement back and forth between steps. 
For Bynner (2005), however, many studies of emerging adulthood underestimate economic 
destabilisation and the fundamental way individual roles and identities are shaped to match 
structural forces and social conditions. Indeed, social and economic shifts featuring de-
industrialisation, post-Fordist restructuring and a more individualised ‘risk society’ (Beck, 
1992; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002), have helped undermine linear and normative paths 
from family of origin to family of destination. A specific issue has been ‘flexibilisation’ of 
employment in which education practices and job opportunities have been decoupled (cf. 
Mythen, 2005). More chaotic family careers and household fragmentation can thus be 
understood as consequences of increased precarity in transition pathways and not simply 
outcomes of greater freedom and the exploration of identities.  
Research on Japanese modernity has been resistant to categorisations and explanations derived 
from western contexts (Beck and Grande, 2010). Although evidence suggests that Japanese 
people have become increasingly individualized (see Suzuki et al., 2010), opportunities for, 
and manifestations of individualism have been constrained by deeply embedded social 
concerns with harmony, homogeneity and intergenerational continuity that have accompanied 
Japan’s high-speed growth and compressed socioeconomic modernity (Sugimoto, 1997). 
Earlier generations of Japanese youth, especially those born during the baby-boom of the late 
1940s and the baby-bust of the 1950s, were largely compelled to follow marriage and work 
careers shaped by the emergence of a postwar social mainstream and conditions of the 
economic growth. Furthermore, institutional structures have shaped routes through the adult 
life-course. While the state orchestrated the system, sociopolitical stability and the amelioration 
of socioeconomic risks were not achieved through redistributive social policy measures but 
rather intermediate groups of private companies and families (Osawa, 1993). Estévez-Abe 
(2008) has argued that the Japanese state achieved a relatively equal distribution of income and 
extensive protection against market risks, despite relatively modest levels of social expenditure, 
through a variety of state interventions including rural public work programmes. Corporate 
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practices, involving secure lifetime employment, seniority-based wages and company welfare, 
were advanced with an individual male-breadwinner’s attachment to a company critical to the 
socioeconomic security of the household. The associated family model reinforced gender roles 
and the ‘family as a unit’ was promoted in every aspect of policy and practice (Izuhara, 2014). 
Routes into and through adulthood were thus corporate-centred with employers pervasive in 
the realm of family life. For men, getting into a better school and then a better university, and 
ultimately a better company guaranteed future security, while for women, getting a better 
husband was normatively reinforced by gendered social policy (Osawa, 1993). 
In the housing context, home ownership became a social and political project that sought to 
widen access to this tenure (Forrest and Hirayama, 2014). Acquiring an owned home became 
increasingly another pillar of welfare and security, and for new household was supported by 
government housing loans along with financial assistance from the company and family. A 
housing ladder emerged as rates of urban home ownership leapt from less than 26% in 1940 to 
64% by 1963 (Hayakawa, 1990). As the tenure grew it became more central to the formation 
of standard families and mainstream households, and ultimately embedded in hegemonic 
perceptions of family transitions and ‘standard life-course’ (Hirayama, 2007).  
Since the bursting of the economic bubble in the 1990s, however, economic stagnation has 
undermined this social order with younger people having more leeway in not following 
standard paths into adult life (Toivonen, 2013). Employment opportunities began to diminish 
and company welfare programmes were hollowed out. Neoliberal reforms in labour laws also 
allowed for a massive increase in non-regular contractual conditions for new employees, 
leading to a rise in part-time and temporary employment from 15.8% to 38.0% of total 
employment between 1982 and 2010. Young people were particularly affected with the rate of 
irregular employment among those aged 20-24, increasing to 43.1% (MHLW, 2012). As 
economic conditions of male breadwinner households diminished, female labour market 
participation increased (from 58% to 68% between 1980 and 2005), especially those on non-
regular contracts. Practices concerning recruitment, pay and career pathways, meanwhile, 
continued to favour male workers (Hirao, 2007).  
Emerging adulthood in Japan then, has to be considered in regard to a diversity of factors. 
Traditional western approaches have overwhelmingly focused on two strands of the transition 
to adulthood: the school-to-work transition and family formation. Similarly, individualization 
has been considered a relatively homogenous process where individuals enjoy greater agency 
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in shaping life-courses by taking on greater risks within a more volatile socio-economic system. 
Contemporary research on emerging adulthood in Japan has also focused on labour markets 
(e.g. Brinton, 2010; Inui, 2009; Toivonen, 2013) and marriage and family formation (e.g. 
Ishida, 2013; Raymo, 2003; Raymo and Iwasawa, 2005) but typically in isolation. In this paper, 
we bring the housing dimension more fully into the discussion. Housing markets and careers 
are also embedded in the framework of emerging adulthood and both reflect and critically 
reinforce shifting work and marriage transitions.  
Although housing careers are clearly entwined, both culturally and materially, how housing 
pathways vary between contexts has not been broadly examined (cf. Beer and Faulkner, 2011; 
Calvert, 2010; Forrest and Yip, 2012). European research has suggested that routes into 
adulthood are not only defined by natal home leaving, but are bound up with movement through 
different types of housing tenure. In particular, Mulder (2006) identifies that in some contexts, 
especially those where homeownership is normatively embedded with marriage and child 
bearing, that unfavourable shifts in housing market conditions can undermine family formation. 
Indeed, household and housing tenure transitions provide identity markers and economic 
foundations necessary for achieving adult status with, typically, the achievement of 
homeownership synonymous with maturity and independence, and providing a basis for long-
term partnership and fecundity (Mulder, 2006; Mulder & Billari, 2010). Housing systems are 
thus critical in mediating transition from dependence to independence 
This paper is particularly concerned with processes by which housing contexts mediate adult 
transition and the dynamics of home leaving, new household formation and family careers. In 
Japan, recent research has already suggested important links between housing and life-course 
transitions (Hirayama and Ronald 2008, Izuhara 2014), as well as the salience of urban 
conditions and housing markets in shaping the life choices of younger people (Ronald and 
Hirayama, 2009). The indication has been that declining marriage is being translated into an 
explosion of both one-person households and people staying on indefinitely in the parental 
home; and that the housing system plays a significant role in the processes. There are, 
furthermore, important implications for understanding interactions between households and 
housing, and social atomization and individualisation that are critical to the increasing precarity 
of younger people in Japan. Our argument extends the debate concerning structural, economic 
transformations or increasing agency in delaying adulthood (i.e. Arnett, 2000, 2006; Bynner, 
2005), by considering processes underlying the emerging patterns of young people in reaching 




Marriage and family formation 
Across developed societies, less marriage and lower fertility has been explained by longer 
waiting periods prior to bearing children, with cohabitation often providing an alternative 
(Arnett, 2000). In most contexts marriage has lost salience as a marker of adult status and as a 
conduit to parenthood and socioeconomic independence. In Japan, on the other hand, marriage 
remains fundamental to child bearing and achieving economic security, and a central aspiration 
for young men and women alike (Ochiai, 2014; Raymo and Iwasawa, 2005, Retherford, et al; 
2001). Thus, while understanding of emerging adulthood and reflexive modernisation 
emphasise explorations in identity and lifestyle, and the freedom to experiment with sexual 
relationships, adult transitions in Japan arguably reflects more a disalignment between desires 
for hegemonic marital relationships and means by which to realise them. This is not to suggest 
that attitudes have not changed, but rather, structural factors play significant roles. 
While the average age of marriage has progressively increased1, there has also been a 
substantial rise in people who do not seem to be marrying at all. Between 1995 and 2010 the 
ratio of women aged 25-29 who were still unmarried advanced from 48.1% to 54%, while the 
rate of women aged 30-34 increased from 19.7% 26.6%. Among men, equivalent non-marriage 
rates escalated from 66.8% to 69.3% and 37.3% to 42.9% (MIAC, 2013). Data suggests, that 
this represents more than just a large delay in the age Japanese people settle down, and reflects 
a society in which a growing group of people are not partnering. The latest national survey on 
Attitudes toward Marriage and Family (IPSSR, 2011) found that of the growing number of 
unmarried people aged 18 to 35, 61% of men and 49% of women aged 18-34 were not engaged 
in any kind of romantic relationship. This represents a 10% increase on five years earlier and 
an overall trend towards men and women simply not getting together at all. A comparison of 
cumulative sexual intercourse rates in different birth cohorts (Matsuura., 2005), found that 
while the age at first sexual intercourse fell for generations born 1960 to 1975, average age has 
again risen for more recent generations of young people. Another recent study indicated that 
30.2% of unmarried men in their 30s and 14. 8% of women have never dated (Meiji Yasuda 
Insurance, 2013).    
                                                          
1 The average at first marriage is now 31years old for men and 29 for women (Cabinet Office, 2011) 
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In Europe, by contrast, although marriage has also declined, unmarried conjugal partnerships 
function similarly and often produce children. According to Jones (2007), although the chance 
of never being married at 34 years old in Western Europe is 53%, if we include those who 
cohabit with a partner, we have an ‘effectively single’ rate of about 33%. Furthermore, as many 
current singles will have been in a partnership at some point before, the group who are ‘single, 
never-cohabited’ is only around 23%. In contrast, according to recent Japanese survey data, as 
few as 2% of single men and women currently cohabit as an unmarried couple and only 9% 
have ever experienced cohabitation at some point before their mid-30s (IPSSR, 2011). In 
comparative terms, although Japan demonstrates a similar ratio of singles to Europe (47% for 
men and 32% for women aged 30 to 34), due to low past and present cohabitation, the number 
of ‘effectively single to this point in time’ is much higher. Moreover, although numbers of 
cohabiting individuals were increasing until 2005 (the figure declined in 2010), they have not 
contributed significantly to the formation of households with children (about 1.7% of children 
in Japan are born outside marriage).  
Historically, arranged marriages played an important role, with this approach still accounting 
for 29.4% of marriages as recently as 1982. By 2005 the ratio had fallen to 6.4%. Various 
studies have thus looked to dating and marriage markets as the cause – and solution – to the 
decline in coupling (e.g. Ishida, 2013; Yoshida, 2010). Even the state has become involved, 
with special agencies established by local governments to assist people with mate-searching 
activities. Indeed, an entire industry has emerged that provides young people with socializing 
opportunities in order to assist marriage hunting (konkatsu). Nonetheless, despite the focus on 
interaction, shifts in employment and the structure of welfare are also of significance.   
In particular, improved education and labour market participation among women is argued to 
have increased their capacity to live without a husband, while also reducing the available pool 
of appropriate partners (cf. Raymo and Iwasawa, 2008; Shirahase, 2007; Tsuya et al., 2005). 
Fukuda (2009), however, has more recently argued the reverse: that a high earning potential of 
women with post-secondary education leads to a greater likelihood of marriage. While there 
has been a growing expectancy of wage-earning wives, married women are also still expected 
to take primary responsibility for care of children and elderly parents, as well as domestic 
duties. Younger cohorts of women have however, become more resistant to the double burden 
of paid and unpaid labour, with shifting expectations of a suitable husband: with a growing 
concern with both romantic notions of love and the willingness of a potential partner to share 
domestic responsibilities (Nakano and Wagatsuma, 2004). At the same time, hypergamy 
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(marrying up by income and age) is still dominant2 and while many women have become better 
off, the availability of well-paid and securely employed men has diminished (Tachibanaki, 
2010). For men, economic restructuring, meanwhile, has eroded their capacity to support 
families, with many reluctant to marry until they are financially secure, which may come much 
later in life, if at all. 
Declining marriage then, appears to derive more from frustrated expectations than the exercise 
of freedom and individuality. Data from the latest Attitudes to Marriage Survey (IPSSR, 2011), 
strongly suggests that hegemonic notions of marriage remain powerful, with the vast majority 
of young men (86.3%) and women (89.4%) aged 18 to 34 wanting to get married in the future. 
This represents only a slightly drop since 1980 (from 91.8% and 92.9%, respectively). The 
primary merit of marriage was identified as ‘having your own children and family’, which 
increased between 1987 and 2010 as the main priority for both men, from 19.9% to 33.6%, and 
women, from 33.2% to 47.7%. The biggest obstacle was identified as money by both genders, 
with ‘residence for married life’ second for men (19.3%) and a close third3 for women (at 
15.3%). Framed as a reason for not being able to marry, most singles aged 25 to 34 identify 
finding a suitable partner as the main issue, with this being a slightly larger concern for women 
(51.3%) than men (46.2%). 
 
FIGURE ONE AND TWO HERE 
 
There are, nonetheless, some tensions between the desire for security and self-realization. 
Indeed, the most attractive aspect of single life remains ‘freedom in action and lifestyle’ (65.1% 
for men and 71.4% for women). As Figures One and Two illustrate, among those aged 25 to 
34, the most common reasons for not getting married are, ‘do not feel the necessity’ and ‘do 
not want to give up freedom or comfort’, with the former more significant for men (31.2%) 
than women (30.4%), and the latter more for women (31.1%) than men (25.5%). Qualitative 
research has indicated that younger generations of Japanese have sought to resist the gender 
divided roles of their parent’s generation and seek more from their lives and relationships 
(Nakano and Wagatsuma, 2004). Concomitantly, however, a life without marriage is also 
                                                          
2 In the 2010 Survey of Attitudes to Marriage and Family Among Japanese Singles (IPSSR, 2011), 66.5% of 
female respondents intended to marry someone older (down from 91.1% in 1987)     
3 Getting ‘approval from parents’ remained a strong concern for women, at 17.1%  
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understood to enhance socioeconomic precarity and preclude the possibility of having children. 
For most women it also constitutes exclusion from the corporate-male-breadwinner welfare 
system. 
Individualization seen through the lens of contemporary connubial relationships thus 
demonstrates a particular form in Japan that, while reflecting elements of emerging adulthood 
in regard to the salience of an unmarried, ‘in-between’ life stage featuring greater self-
reflexivity, is distinctly atomized and enduring. Individualisation in this case is characterised 
by structural transformations that intersect employment, gender and welfare, that are 
undermining the formation of couples and conjugal partnerships. This is particularly 
problematic as very few unmarried people in Japan live together as a couple or produce children 
(Raymo and Iwasawa, 2005). Moreover, cohabitation and other types of household formation 
do not represent adequate alternatives to marriage as means to achieve full independent adult 
status, as we now examine.  
 
Adult transitions and the Housing System   
The astonishing rise in younger unmarried people has driven a remarkable shift in household 
arrangements in recent decades. This has, furthermore, been shaped by the specifics of the 
housing context, which we now explicitly examine in order to illustrate its role in diminishing 
transitions to economically independent and biologically reproductive adult roles. Housing 
careers are similar to marriage ones to the extent they structure life-course progression and the 
realisation of socioeconomic independence. They also conceptually feature a ‘ladder’ where 
the first rung (home-leaving) defines a critical life-course transition to an independent 
household (Beer and Faulkner, 2011). In many contexts, full (un-mortgaged) home ownership 
represents a zenith in a housing career that not only sustains particular adult identities, but also 
forms an economic basis to later retirement and intergenerational exchanges of wealth and care 
(Doling and Ronald, 2010). However, contemporary transitions across societies appear to have 
become more complex with evidence of often chaotic and non-linear pathways among young 
home-leavers (e.g. Hochstenbach & Boterman, 2014), and often connected to deregulated 
routes through adulthood (Forrest and Hirayama, 2009). In Japan, while postwar housing 
markets were structurally embedded with standard households and family formation, in the 
post-bubble economy the housing system is reinforcing a form of individualisation and 
transition processes seem to be breaking down.  
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Between 1950 and 1990 house price inflation was rapid and almost continuous, with the state 
increasingly intervening through the Government Housing Loan Corporation (GHLC) to 
sustain finance for owner-occupied, family housing careers (Oizumi, 2007). This helped fuel 
the economic bubble of the 1980s as well as the 1990s crash, with both events undermining the 
stability of, and flows into, the owner-occupied housing market. Although prices declined, a 
deteriorating labour market and increasingly frustrated marriage eroded the capacity and desire 
for new households to either form or enter the housing market4. Meanwhile, in context of 
growing neoliberal influences, in the 2000s state support for housing faded with the withdrawal 
of GHLC loans and further reductions in the already small public housing sector5. 
 
FIGURE THREE HERE 
 
Changing housing policy and market conditions added to the obstacles faced by younger people 
attempting to transverse hegemonic life courses, and, as Figure Three illustrates, there has been 
a remarkable reversal of post-war housing trends. Rates of owner occupation among 
independent households under-thirty fell from 17.9% to 7.5%, and for 30 to 39 year-olds from 
53.3% to 39% between 1983 and 2008. This decline has been linked with the fall in early life 
transitions (see Hirayama, 2013) with, according to the latest Population Census, an average 
12% drop between 1985 and 2005 in the formation of new family households in the 25 to 29, 
30 to 34 and 35 to 39 age categories. It appears that under post-bubble conditions, movement 
into an independent household and up a housing ladder has become problematic. The outcome 
has been a dramatic shift in housing and household careers featuring a boom in unmarried post-
youth adults either staying longer, or indefinitely, in the natal home or living alone as a one-
person household. Both of which inhibit the formation of conjugal couples and the achievement 
of independent adulthood.  
 
Remaining at parental home 
Individuals either remaining in parental home, or returning to it following an unsuccessful 
transition to independence, account for much of the fall in new family households, and while 
                                                          
4 A new apartment in greater Tokyo is still 7.9 times average annual income, and in Tokyo city 9.4 times higher 
(Demographia, 2013). 
5 The share of public rental housing fell from 7.5% of housing in 1988 to 6.7% in 2003 
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less than one-in-ten people aged 30 to 34 lived in their parent’s homes in 1980, this increased 
to more than one-in-four by 2010. For people aged 25 to 29, more than 40% still live ‘at home’ 
with their parents (cf. Hirayama, 2013). The root of this ‘failure to launch’ for many younger 
people arguably lies with diminishing employment and marriage prospects, but also the lack of 
housing alternatives for low- or no-income singles. Nishi and Kan (2005) have identified a 
growing relationship between work and household situation for those aged 20 to 34, with the 
unemployment rate of those living with parents increasing from 4.1% in 1980 to 9.7% in 2004, 
compared to average cohort rates of 2.5% and 6.8%. Similarly, the latest IPSSR survey (2011) 
found that while the ratio of unmarried people (age 18-34) living with parents is 70% for men 
(75% for women), the rate is 66.7% for full time employees compared to 83% for those in 
irregular work and 88% among the unemployed6.  
For post-adolescent youth with limited income there are few alternatives to staying on in their 
parent’s homes. The fact that older cohorts had an historic opportunity to cheaply access larger, 
owner-occupied homes, has also allowed them to protect their offspring from exposure to 
housing costs, sustaining middle-class living conditions. At the same time, the ratio of people 
aged 65 and over living with an unmarried child has advanced from 10.8% in 1985 to 18.5% 
in 2010 (MIAC, 2013), suggesting that many of Japan’s older people are being cared for by 
adult children who have not managed to form families of their own. This appears related to 
housing conditions, with the past embedding of home ownership facilitating intergenerational 
exchanges, but also hindering housing transitions for the next generation, who face entirely 
different market conditions.  
It has been argued that marriage and new household formation are closely related in Japan 
(Hirayama and Izuhara, 2008) with reason to assume that post-youth adults living 
independently of parents are more likely to marry (Raymo, 2003). According to the annual 
panel survey of young adults conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare in 2007, 
a higher proportion of single men and women in their 20s and early-30s living independently 
got married in the preceding five years (Figure Four). There were also gender differences with 
the effect being ostensibly stronger for women in their early-20s and for men in their late-20s 
and early-30s. These effects can be explained in part by differences in the average ages that 
women and men get married. It may also be related the link between job security, income and 
the likelihood of marriage among men (Tachibanaki, 2010). In other words, those who can 
                                                          
6 For women the respective figures are 76.3% compared to 85.6 and 86.9%. 
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afford to live independently are more likely to be backed by a secure income, connecting 
employment status to housing independence as conditions for marriage. Nonetheless, even for 
those who do leave the natal home to form an independent one-person household, housing 
market conditions can be restrictive for further adult transition. 
 
FIGURE FOUR HERE 
 
Living Alone 
While in most developed societies policy measures exist that support early housing careers (see 
Forrest and Yip, 2012), in Japan, public rental housing targets vulnerable family households 
and elderly singles. Few benefits are available to individuals living alone and there are no cash 
benefits for tenants. Company rental housing units offered to new recruits have assisted 
housing transitions to independent living in the early postwar period. However, this pillar has 
also receded in recent years with, according the Institute of Labour Administration Survey 
(2007), half (49.5%) of companies which owned dormitories for single employees closing or 
consolidating provision since 20007. The introduction of rental assistance is a current policy 
discussion in Japan, and the needs of younger people are a particular concern. How to introduce 
a user subsidy is also an issue. In many countries age is factored into eligibility and benefit 
calculations with an assumption that younger people will live in shared accommodation8. In 
Japan, however, living in a shared home with non-family members is extremely rare (around 
2% of people in their 20s), and the overwhelming majority of unmarried people who manage 
to leave the natal home become one-person households.  
Nationally, the ratio of one-person households advanced from 15.8% to 32.4% between 1980 
and 2010, and is expected to reach 37.2% in the next two decades (MIAC, 2013). While other 
demographic groups (particular widows and divorcees) have been important, ‘never married’ 
people under 40 have been a driver of this trend. The housing system meanwhile has shaped a 
particular manifestation. Firstly, the small size (see below) of the average rental unit makes 
such housing particularly suitable for single people with one income, living alone. The 
                                                          
7 The rate of downsizing was particularly severe among large companies with 1000 and more employees 
(58.4%), compared to their small-size counterparts with less than 300 employees (21.4%) although few smaller 
companies (84%) did not even own company dormitories before 2000. 
8 For example, in Britain, single people under the age of 35 in private rental accommodation are normally only 
entitled to housing benefits (local housing allowance) at the shared accommodation rate (renting a single room 
in a shared house) and are not expected to have their own flat. 
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constitution of the sector has thus been affected by changing demand with 57% or private rental 
units occupied by single-person households in 2005, up from 48% in 1990 (MLIT, 2013). 
Secondly, a new market of super compact condominiums catering to economically established 
singles has emerged, especially in central urban districts (cf. Kubo and Yui, 2011). 
Nonetheless, for younger adults seeking independence, renting alone is the primary option 
with, for example, around eight-in-ten one-person households aged 25 to 29 renting privately. 
There is also a connection to economic status with around 81% of one-person households 
renting in this age group9 earning less than five million yen a year (Hirayama, 2013).  
While achieving residential autonomy may increase chances of marriage in comparison to 
living in the natal home (Raymo, 2003), it usually necessitates a prolonged period of living 
alone and presents other obstacles to early life-course transitions. Firstly, due to the 
restructuring of economic conditions, chances of moving on to home ownership for singles are 
limited. Home purchase typically requires a 25% deposit while mortgage costs have increased 
as a proportion of disposable income by around 50% since 1995. Saving conditions for renters 
have also deteriorated, with the ratio of disposable income spent on housing increasing from 
12.4% to 19.9% for single men under 40, and from 19.0% to 24.7% for single women (MLIT, 
2013). Ostensibly, becoming a dual income household has become central to moving up the 
housing ladder. In Japan, nonetheless, cohabitation is rare and home-purchase often a condition 
of marriage rather than an outcome.  
Secondly, the nature of the rental stock can be restrictive to the formation of relationships. 
While Japanese owner-occupied housing is comparable in quality and size, rental housing is 
much smaller in comparison to other societies10. According to the Land and Housing Survey, 
around 50.6% of rental housing is less than 49m2 and more than half of this is less than 29m2. 
In Tokyo, where 52.3% of housing is rented, 40.9% of rental units are smaller than 29m2. 
Furthermore, although the officially designated minimum living space for single occupants is 
25m2, only 80.4% of private tenants met this minimum standard for space (MIAC, 2013). 
Critically, along with the growth of one-person households has been a boom in compact one-
room apartments that while facilitating routes into independent living for many, are particularly 
small and limiting: typically comprising a single room with cooking facilities for one (see Kubo 
                                                          
9 The rate is 63.4% of those aged 30 to 34 
10 Owner-occupied homes in Japan have an average of 124m2 of floor space, whereas rental homes have 46.3m2. 
In Germany by comparison the respective ratio is 124m2 to 76m2, in France, 114m2 to 76m2 in France, and in 
the UK, 95m2 to 75m2 (BCJ, 2013) 
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and Yui, 2011; Ronald and Hirayama, 2009). These dwelling types are not conducive to the 
development of relationships, and their proliferation is also crowding out other forms of 
housing more suited to couples and potential child rearing in this tenure. Blocks of compact 
apartment units have, meanwhile, been considered disconnected from the neighborhood and 
their residents, particularly isolated (TMG, 2004) 
 
Discussion  
While international research has emphasized alignments between school leaving and 
employment, on the one hand, and increasing self-reflexivity and the exploration of identities, 
on the other, our examination of adult transitions in Japan has taken a middle course. By doing 
so it has attempted to embed partnering, marriage and housing practices with structural and 
subjective explanations for delayed or emerging adulthood. Individualization is strongly related 
to shifts in late modernity regarding shifting frameworks of risk and security (Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim, 2002). In western contexts, this implies the rolling back of the welfare state, the 
waning of family and the flexibisation of labour. In Japan, state-led developmentalism, 
corporate paternalism and the male-breadwinner standard family model together once 
constituted a framework that resisted individualization and sustained social stability during the 
era of rapid economic growth. Japan’s compressed modernity has subsequently produced a 
more distinct second modernity (Beck and Grande, 2010) and, as the security of ‘enterprise 
society’ has faded, greater pressure has arguably come to bear on the family (cf. Ochiai, 2014). 
For those entering adulthood in the post-bubble economy, the fading of corporate welfare and 
income security has had a particular impact on the formation of couples and rates of marriage. 
As family formation declined, so to have conventional transitions into independent living and 
through housing careers. Both marriage and housing careers are, nonetheless, pillars of welfare 
stability and transition through them still critical to achieving full socioeconomic independence 
and countering risk.  
Comparative research has pointed to international convergence in terms of emerging 
adulthood, but also consistent cross-national differences within it (cf. Buchmann and Kreisi, 
2011). Welfare regimes play a part in mediating transitions, accounting for international 
differences, with movement from the parental home to independent status occurring much 
earlier in social democratic and liberal regimes (such as Northern Europe) where either welfare 
entitlements or markets provide the basis of early departures (as well as cohabitation and 
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extramarital children), and later ones in the Southern European regime (Billari, 2004). Japan 
ostensibly shares features with the latter where the family is more important to welfare 
conditions and home leaving occurs later (and is normatively linked to marriage and child 
bearing). However, employers have also been central pillars of welfare in Japan, quite rigidly 
structuring standard families and the ways they are formed and reproduced. The state has thus 
not been required, until recently at least, to provide alternative assistance for younger people, 
and has, rather, focused on complimenting the company system (i.e. establishing a broad 
educational infrastructure). As enterprise society has been hollowed out, however, its 
membership has contracted with a growing number of youth compelled to fall back on 
individual resources and, in many cases, the natal family. In this sense individualisation has 
more salience than individualism in understanding changing adult transitions.  
Social attitudes have also been attributed to particular patterns of adult transition (see 
Buchmann and Kriesi, 2011), with more socially conservative societies associated with later 
home leaving. Nevertheless, relationships between values and welfare structures are difficult 
to pull apart. In Japan, discourses surrounding the family are powerful, but belie a disjuncture. 
For Ueno (1994), while relatively low divorce and extra-marital births have been taken to 
indicate consistency in Japanese families, other indices have illustrated significant decline: i.e. 
sharp increases in people not marrying at all and declining fertility. Essentially, ‘family’ and 
‘marriage’ remain normative axes but no longer align so well with the social processes by 
which people move through adult life-courses. Moreover, family norms also hinder the 
formation of alternative lifestyles and aspirations that would facilitate alternate adult 
transitions.  
Of course, many Japanese people do marry young and most get married by their early-30s. 
Nonetheless, delays and diverse pathways are becoming characteristic and growing numbers 
are not marrying at all. This may well represent a proliferation of emerging adulthood and an 
escalation in reflexive individualization (cf. Arnett, 2000; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). 
On the other hand, Japanese emerging adulthood is deeply rooted in social and economic 
restructuring and manifest in a particularly isolated form – characterized by being or living 
alone – that, based on the data presented above, suggests younger people are being prevented 
from, rather than choosing not to, marry and adopt hegemonic, reproductive adult roles. Life 
as a post-youth singleton has, for many, become an enduring condition and not just a life-course 
delay, as demonstrated by rising numbers of ‘never-married’ people aged over 50. The impact 
of socioeconomic restructuring on emerging adulthood has been powerful with recent shifts in 
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adult transitions demonstrating a particular precarity, especially in context of the limited 
support outside standard family careers. Furthermore, as we have also illustrated, the persistent 
singledom intrinsic to contemporary Japanese early adulthood – living either alone or with 
parent/s – has a marked impact on housing career transitions that shape an incomplete version 
of adult status and only a partial achievement of economic independence.  
Although the connections between housing and individualization have been examined in but a 
few contexts (Beer and Faulkner, 2011), Japan presents a remarkably insightful case. A 
particular combination of housing stock, market conditions and urban dwelling practices has 
helped translate not getting married into a particular form of residential isolation. Arguably, 
the growth of urban single dwellers, which now account for around half of all Tokyo 
households, may be considered a type of super-individualization where people are spatially 
atomized and isolated. The significant rise of young men and women staying on as adults in 
their parent’s homes arguably reflects another form of isolation which relies on the family to 
support an individualized life course; typically one with fewer chances of finding a partner. At 
the same time, young singles in Japan do not seem to exhibit strong individualistic aspirations 
and cling to hegemonic notions of marriage and family careers.  
The housing context of emerging adulthood has transformed the meaning of home for many 
post-youth adults. While the word ‘home’ in Japan also denotes family in the Japanese 
language, and has historically been a symbol of stability and permanence, it has become a 
recent focus of social transformation and a ‘conduit of atomization for younger generations’ 
(Ronald and Hirayama, 2009, p.2836). For Allison (2013) a new form of ‘homelessness’ has 
emerged and is being experienced by increasing swathes of Japanese young adults, both in a 
literal sense, but also figuratively as a sense of not belonging. While natal home dwellers and 
one-person households in compact apartments live in dwellings, many are not establishing the 
sense of ‘home’ that forms the basis for a full and secure adult life. Allison thus describes such 
lives as ones of ‘ordinary refugeeism’ (p.43).  
The restrictive notion of home embodied by male-breadwinner nuclear family households and 
detached owner-occupied houses has, however, recently begun to open up to one other vision 
of collective living. Since the turn of the century a growing phenomenon has been ‘share 
house’, with a number of private real estate companies attempting to meet growing demand for 
low-cost rental housing among young urban singles by converting dwellings that have become 
unoccupied due to shifting family and commercial demand, into shared houses with communal 
facilities for non-related renters. Despite the absence of a culture of home sharing, a tentative 
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boom has taken hold with, according to a survey by the leading company (Hitsuji Real Estate, 
2014), an increase from less than 400 rooms in shared houses in Tokyo in 2000, to 17,500 by 
2013. Most sharers are post-youth adults with an average age of 27.8, and around two-thirds 
are women, although, along with growth in mixed gender houses, the ratio of men is increasing.  
To some extent these collective lettings compensate declines in company dorms that once 
housed many parental home leavers. However, shared houses are also associated with a new 
type of fictive family constituted of non-related members who not only share dwelling space, 
but are explicitly involved in a social act of living together. Critically, shared housing 
represents an unexpected use of the housing stock as well as a pioneering approach to living 
an adult life outside the bounds of either a corporation or the hegemonic family household, 
which has been largely unheard of among developed East Asian countries.  
 
Conclusions 
This paper has sought to illustrate how the housing system mediates adult transitions from 
dependent to independent status, and more precisely different life-course transitions involving 
family, housing and work. While not unique (cf. Forrest and Yip, 2012), in Japan the 
interconnections are particularly strong. For example, unlike traditional co-residency, 
contemporary marriage determines independence from the parental home. Having a secure 
income is also the basis for forming an independent household. The housing system, 
meanwhile, regulates the dwelling type and tenure that different types of new household can 
access. An outcome of the socioeconomic changes of recent decades has been a rather rigid 
form of emerging adulthood featuring a growing number of young single people living ‘alone’ 
with their parents, or simply forming a single-person household. This ‘in-between’ life stage is 
quite distinct from the identity exploration and lifestyle experimentation identified in western 
societies (e.g. Arnett, 2000). Our analysis also suggests then that connections with welfare 
relations, regime restructuring and a specific manifestation of individualization, and may thus 
also have salience for understanding recent booms in young urban singles in other developed 
East Asian countries, such as South Korea.   
The social implications of continued declines in family formation are considerable even though 
forming an independent household on ones’ own can also represent a means of achieving 
adulthood. A specific issue is the diminishing basis of the family as welfare provider. In context 
of societal ageing in Japan, with more than a quarter of the population aged 65 and over, 
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increasing numbers of older people, especially home-owning parents, are relying on adult 
children to care for them. An increasing ratio of these are, as we have seen, unmarried people 
in their 30s and 40s living in the natal home. However, as ‘never-marrieds’ age, they will not 
have the same kinship networks to fall back on. Furthermore, while flows of inheritance 
provide a buffer (Izuhara, 2002), ageing single people are unlikely to become homeowners. 
For women in particular, achieving home ownership and marriage are strongly tied, with the 
chance of an unmarried woman achieving home ownership around one in twelve (Hirayama 
and Izuhara, 2008). While buying your own home is important to achieving adult status, it is 
even more important to accessing good quality housing as well as a large financial asset and 
an income-in-kind (as an un-mortgaged owner-occupier) that provides security in later life.  
Critically missing are state interventions that compensate the decline of enterprise society, 
standard families and linear housing careers. Social policies remain orientated toward family 
households as a means to support younger adults despite their declining salience. Clearly, new 
policy approaches that allow post-youth adults to become independent in the absence of 
traditional mechanisms, such as getting married and finding a permanent full-time job, are now 
imperative. Considering the links with other domains, new housing policies (such as housing 
allowances) may be particularly effective. Since the turn of the century, Japanese governments 
have given particular attention to changes in the family, but remain focused on conventional 
nuclear family types in terms of changing relationships between married spouses (to support 
more working women). Other household configurations and life-courses (i.e. one-parent 
families, cohabiting couples and one-person households), have received little assistance. 
Indeed, the latest Abe administration has led a pro-family campaign encouraging dependence 
on, and the utilization of, family resources to absorb emerging social risks. A necessary 
requirement, nonetheless, would be a different kind of safety net to support post-youth adult 
transitions away from the parental home and into a more secure and flexible housing sector. 
 
References  
Allison, A. (2013) Precarious Japan, Durham, Duke University Press 
Arnett, J. J. (2000) Emerging adulthood: A theory of development from the late teens through 
the twenties. American psychologist, 55(5), 469. 
Arnett, J. J. (2006). Emerging Adulthood in Europe: A Response to Bynner, Journal of youth 
studies, 9(1), 111-123. 
20 
 
BCJ (2013) A Quick Look at Housing in Japan, Tokyo: Building Centre of Japan  
Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, London: Sage 
Beck, U. & Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2002) Individualization, London: Sage.  
Beck, U. & Grande, E. (2010) Varieties of Second Modernity: The Cosmopolitan Turn in 
Social and Political Theory and Research, British Journal of Sociology, 61(3) 409-443 
Beer, A., & Faulkner, D. (2011). Housing transitions through the life course: aspirations, 
needs and policy, The Policy Press. 
Biggart, A., Stauber, B., & Walther, A. (2001). Avoiding misleading trajectories: Transition 
dilemmas of young adults in Europe, Journal of youth studies, 4(1), 101-118. 
Billari, F.C. (2004). Becoming an adult in Europe: A macro(/micro)-demographic 
perspective. Demographic Research, 3(2), 15-44. 
Brinton, M.C. (2010) Lost in transition: Youth, education and work in post industrial Japan, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press  
Buchmann, M. C., & Kriesi, I. (2011) Transition to adulthood in Europe, Annual Review of 
Sociology, 37, 481-503 
Bynner, J. (2005) Rethinking the youth phase of the life-course: the case for emerging 
adulthood? Journal of youth studies, 8(4), 367-384. 
Calvert, E. (2010) Young People’s housing transitions in context, Centre for Population Change 
Working Paper, Southampton, University of Southampton  
Doling, J., & Ronald, R. (2010). Home ownership and asset-based welfare. Journal of Housing 
and the Built Environment, 25(2), 165-173. 
Estévez-Abe, M. (2008) Welfare and Capitalism in Postwar Japan: Party, Bureaucracy, and 
Business, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Forrest, R. & Hirayama, Y. (2014) The financialisation of the social project: Embedded 
liberalism, neoliberalism and home ownership, Urban Studies, DOI: 
10.1177/0042098014528394 
Forrest, R. & Hirayama, Y. (2009) The uneven impact of neoliberalism on housing 
opportunities, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 33(4), 998-1013 
Forrest, R. & Yip, N-M. (2012) Young People and Housing: Transitions, trajectories and 
generational fractures, London: Routledge 
Fukuda, S. (2009) Shifting economic foundation of marriage in Japan: The erosion of 
traditional marriage, MPIDR Working Paper WP 2009-033 November 2009 
21 
 
Furlong, A. & Cartmel, F. (2007) Young People and Social Change: New Perspectives, Open 
University Press. 
Genda, Y. (2002) Shigoto no naka no aimai na fuan [Ambiguous anxiety in work], Tokyo: 
Chuou Kouron Shinsha. 
Hayakawa, K. (1990) Japan, in Van Vliet (ed) International Handbook of Housing Policies 
and Practices, Westport, Greenwood Press  
Hirao, K. (2007) Contradictions in maternal roles in contemporary Japan, in T. W. 
Devasahayam and B.S.A. Yeoh (eds.) Working and Mothering: Images, Ideologies and 
Identities, NIAS Press. 
Hirayama, Y. (2007) Reshaping the housing system: home ownership as a catalyst for social 
transformation, in Y. Hirayama and R. Ronald (eds) Housing and Social Transition in 
Japan, London, Routledge 
Hirayama, Y. (2013) Housing and generational fractures in Japan, in R. Forrest and N-M. Yip 
(eds) Young People and Housing: Transitions, trajectories and generational fractures, 
London, Routledge, 159-76. 
Hirayama, Y. & Izuhara, M. (2008) Women and Housing Assets in Context of Japan’s Home 
Owning Democracy, Journal of Social Policy, 37(4) 641-660  
Hirayama, R. & Ronald, R. (2008) Baby-boomers, baby-busters and the lost generation: 
generational fractures in Japan's homeowner society, Urban Policy and Research, 26(3) 
325-342 
Hitsuji Real Estate (2014) Survey on ‘Share House’ http://www.hituji.jp/  
Hochstenbach, C., & Boterman, W. R. (2014). Navigating the field of housing: housing 
pathways of young people in Amsterdam. Journal of Housing and the Built 
Environment, DOI 
Inui, A. (2009) NEETS, freeters and flexibility: reflecting precarious situation in the new labour 
market, in A. Furlong (ed.) Handbook of Youth and Young Adulthood: new Perspectives 
and Agendas, Abingdon, Routledge  
Ishida, H. (2013) The Transition to Adulthood among Japanese Youths: Understanding 
Courtship in Japan, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, 646(1) 86-106 
IPSSR (2011) Institute of Population and Social Security research, http://www.ipss.go.jp/site-
ad/index_english/nfs14/Nfs14_Singles_Eng.pdf  




Izuhara, M. (2002) Care and Inheritance: Japanese and English Perspectives on the 
'Generational Contract', Ageing and Society, 22(1) 61-77 
Izuhara, M. (2014) Life-course diversity, housing choices and constraints for women of the 
‘lost’ generation in Japan, Housing Studies, DOI 10.1080/02673037.2014.933780 
Jones, G.W. (2007) Delayed marriage and very low fertility in Pacific Asia, Population and 
Development Review 33, 3: 453-478. 
Kohli, M. (2007) The institutionalization of the life course: Looking back to look ahead, 
Research in Human Development, 4(3-4), 253-271.  
Kubo, T and Yui, Y (2011) Transformation of the housing market in Tokyo since the late 
1990s: Housing purchases by single person households, Asia and African Studies, 
XV(3) pp3-21  
Matsuura, K. (2005) Nihon Jin no Seiko Kaishi Nenrei no Teinenreika-Konenreika ni kansuru 
Tokei Kaiseki [Statistics analysis on shifting starting age of sexual relationships among 
Japanese people], in Sato, Ikuo (ed.) Nozomanai Ninshin, Jinko Ninshin Chuzetsu wo 
Boshi suru tameno Koka-teki na Hinin Kyoiku Program no Kaihatsu ni kansuru 
Kenkyu, pp.490-505 
 
Meiji Yasuda Insurance (2013) Survey of Marriage and Childbirth, 
http://www.meijiyasuda.co.jp/english/  
MIAC (2013) Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Population 
http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/index.htm  
Miyamato, M. (2004) Posuto Seinen ki to oyako senryaku [The post-youth period and 
intergenerational strategies], Tokyo, Keiso Shobo  
MLIT (2013) Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, White Paper on Homeownership, 
http://www.mlit.go.jp/hakusyo/mlit/h24/hakusho/h25/pdfindex.html   
Mulder, C.H. (2006) Population and housing: a two-sided relationship, Demographic Research, 
15, 402- 412 
Mulder, C. H., & Billari, F. C. (2010), Homeownership regimes and low fertility, Housing 
Studies, 25(4), 527-541. 
Mythen, G. (2005) Employment, Individualization and Insecurity: Rethinking the Risk Society 
Perspective, The Sociological Review, 53(1), 129-149  
Nakano, L & Wagatsuma, M. (2004) Mothers and their Unmarried Daughters: An intimate 
look at Generational Change, in G Mathews and B White (eds) Japan’s Changing 
generations: Are Young People Creating a new Society? London, Routledge 
23 
 
Nishi, F. & Kan, M. (2005) Oya to Dokyo no Jakunen Mikon-sya no Saikin no Jyokyo Tokei 
[Recent trends on young single people living with parents], No.8, pp.83-87  
Oizumi, E. (2007) Transformations in housing construction and finance, in Y. Hirayama and 
R. Ronald (eds) Housing and Social Transition in Japan, London, Routledge  
Osawa, M. (1993) Kigyo Chuushin Shakai wo Koete: Gendai Nihon wo Gender de Yomu 
[Beyond the Firm Orientated Society: Examining Japan Society through Gender], 
Tokyo, Juji Press  
Ochiai, E. (2014) Leaving the West, rejoining the East? Gender and family in Japan’s semi-
compressed modernity, International Sociology, 29(3) 209-228 
Raymo, J.M. (2003) Premarital living arrangements and the transition to first marriage in Japan, 
Journal of Marriage and Family, 65 (2), 302-315 
Raymo, J.M. & Iwasawa, M. (2005) Marriage market mismatches in Japan: An alternative view 
of the relationship between women's education and marriage, American Sociological 
Review, 70 (5), 801-822 
Ronald, R. & Hirayama, Y (2009) Home alone: the individualization of young, urban Japanese 
singles, Environment and Planning A, 41, 2836 – 2854 
 
Sato, R., Shiraishi, N., Beppu, M., & Tanaka, K. (2010) Changing transition to adulthood: 
youth and postwar social and demographic transformation in Japan, in R. Sato 
(Ed.), The changing transition to adulthood in Japan: Current demographic research 
and policy implications,Tokyo: National Institute of Population and Social Security 
Research. 
 
Shirahase, S. (2007) Women’s economic status and fertility: Japan in cross-national 
perspective, in F. M. Rosenbluth (ed), The Political Economy of Japan’s Low Fertility, 
Stanford University Press 
Sugimoto, Y. (1997) An Introduction to Japanese Society, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press  
Suzuki, M., Ito, M., Ishida, M., Nihei, N & M. Maruyama (2010) Individualizing Japan: 
Searching for its origin in first modernity, The British Journal of Sociology, 61(3): 513-
38. 
Tachibanaki, T. (2010) The New Paradox for Japanese Women, Tokyo: I-House Press 
Toivonen, T. (2013) Japan's Emerging Youth Policy: Getting Young Adults Back to Work, 
London and New York, Routledge 
24 
 
TMG (2004) Tokyoto Jyutaku Hakusyo, Toshin Kyojyu no Daini Maku [white paper on 
housing, the second stage of urban living in city center], Department of Housing, Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government 
Tsuya, N. O., Bumpass, L. L Choe, M. K. & Rindfuss. R. R. (2005) Is the gender division of 
labor changing in Japan? Asian Population Studies 1, 47–67. 
Ueno, C. (1994) Kindai Kazoku no Seiritsu to Shuuen [The Formation and End of the Modern 
Family], Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten 
Yamada, M. (1999) Parasaito Shinguru no Jidai [The Age of the Parasite Singles], Tokyo: 
Chikuma Shobou  
Yoshida, A. (2010) Role of cultural lag in marriage decline for Japan's boom and bust cohorts, 
Marriage and Family Review. 46, (1-2), 60-78.  
 
